TOlalil)' a/ld 1lljillity, the "face-to-face" relation bctween land other where both terms retain their independence by relating across moral and juridical demands, he characterizes the pluralism the ethical relation as alone making peace possible. He writes: "The unity of plurality is peace, and not the coherence of the elements that constitute plurality. Peace therefore cannot be identified with the end of combats that cease for want of combatants, by the defeat of some and the victory of others, that is, with cemeteries or future universal empires. Peace must be my peace, in a relation that starts from an land goes to the other, in desire and goodness, where thc I both nlaintains itself and exists without e,goism.'" It is this discussion of peace --as a function of thc plurality of persons made possible by ethics --concluding Totality and Injinity that Levinas prefaces with a discussion of war at the beginning of Totality and Illjinity. One way of understanding the very title of Totality alld Illjinity, then, is by reference to the difference between "War and Peace," according to which reading the work performed in the body of Totality and Illjinity, its philosophical labor, would be a joumey from war to peace.
War is first mentioned in the second sentence of Totality and Injinity, directly following its more famous opening sentence, which reads: "Everyone will readily agree that it is of the highest importance to know whether we are not duped by morality."
Totality and Injinity is one long argument that not only are we not duped by morality but precisely morality rather than epistcmology and the ontology constructed under its strictures --represents humanity's only chance of not being duped. Ethics, in contrast to epistemology, does not merely "represenf' the chance of not being duped. The radical sincerity of the moral relations ethics elucidates "accomplish" or "produce" the true. In contrast to the autonomous interests of knowledge, ethics is a wisdom, its "knowledge" is inseparable from virtue, bound to moral and juridical relations which lie at the origin of sense. The proper philosophical mode of ethics, then, is more akin to exegesis than to thematization, for it retains its enrootedness in a signification that exceed its very signs, a language which retains the traces --the moral force --of the saying which is the source of the significations said.
Levinas invokes war, however, as a "strong man" opponent to his argument. It represents the best evidence that humans are indecd duped by morality, that sincerity is itself a charade, an epi-phenomenon, merely a role or mask in a deeper more nefarious plot.
Hence the rhetorical appearance of war immediately after the opening interrogative sentence of Totality and /llfillity. That war belies morality comes as no surprise, perhaps, given Levinas's own expericnces ofwar. But the threat war represents does not depend on the peculiarities of Levinas's life experiences. Its challenge is more serious, more constant, indecd, perennial.
Grammatically, war is introduced into Totality and Infinity with a question. A certain kind of questioning, phiJosophy as fundamental questioning, a questioning of fundamentals, as we shaJl see, introduces war. "Does not lucidity," reads the second sentence, the first interrogative sentence of Totality alld Infinity, "the mind's openness upon the truc, consist in catching sight of the permanent possibility of war?" The question appears strange at first glance. Surely war --expcrienced and depicted in tenns of brute force, bombs, bullets, explosions, devastation, death, wounds, heroism --is a threat to morality, of this there can be little doubt. But is war then a phi/osophica/ issue tuming on "the mind's openness upon the tnle"? How is the mind's recognition of truth, that is to say, science, surely one of humanity's noblest enterprises, at the same time a "catching sight of the permanent possibility ofwar," humanity's most debased condition?
To answer this perplexity, we turn directly to the next sentence: "The state of war suspends morality; it divests the etemal institutions and obligations of their etemity and rescinds ad interim the unconditional imperatives." This is straightforward. Tbe most unconditional of the unconditional imperatives, the most etemal, if one can say this, of the etemal obligations, is, of course, the command not to murder.
Life is minimally the material condition of al1 human endeavors, whether morality, art, sport, religion, or science. Secular and religious agree on this point. Precisely the command not to murder, so goes the positive argument of Totality alld /nfi1lity, is what shines forth as the moral surplus, the ethical transcendence of the "face" of the other, bursting through its very manifestation with more than that presence can contain, as the moral condition of al1 conditions. The face, and by extension the body of the other, the alterity of the other, introduces beyond its own sensuous prescnce, bursting through its own form, the command: "Thou shalt not murder." For Levinas the proper mode of transcendence occurs neither as some miraculous opening of the skies, nor, contesting Heidegger, as anxiety before an ever oncoming death or as the history which would exceed but give meaning to my finitude as its never to be fully appropriated context. Such nleanings do indeed escape the immediate self-presence of consciousness, but they do so as oncoming horizons, as incomplete projects, as the "not yet" appropriated. rather than in the manner of the transcendence of the face of the other, whose alterity pierces subjectivity, challenges it, cuts into..to its deepest recesses. The proximity of the other person, ethical proximity, comes as the imposition of the unassumable, "contact" with alterity as such, the other as a command laid upon the self to rise to unassumable moral obligation, inverting the natural or rational for-itself to the radically insufficiency of a for-the-other, the self as subject to the other, as moral responsibility for the other and for a11 others, hence the seIf as moral expiation, as the very call to social justice, turning thc self inside out.
In the face of the genuine transcendence of morality and justice, subjectivity would emerge as an inversion of its natural COllatus, subject as subjection to the other. These are the lines of thought pursued in Totality and Illfinity. War would make a mockery ofthem.
Is not talk of the irreducible alterity of the other rendered naive and foolish by war, where the other beconles a corpse? And if not the other, then myself. Is not the pacific moral relation made possible by language, speech, expression, where a moral surplus signifies through a "saying" which is always more than what is said, is not this language rendered merely derisory, manipulative, strategic, by the cunning of war propaganda, not to mention the silencing and death effected by bullets, bombs, chemicals and biological weapons? And what of the related silences produced through sophisticated psychological and physiological techniques of torture, brainwashing, police interrogation? To be sure, morality is nöt ignorant of evil. It precisely opposes evil. Just as one person can suffer for another, one person can refuse the other, turn away, remain indifferent. The humanity of ethics is not a steady state but a struggle against the inhumanity of evil. But war is different. There humans kill one another, not like humans but like starved animals. War in this sense is more than the opposite of morality, as evil is the opposite of good, it is rather, as Levinas has indicated, the very suspension of morality. If morality hinges on the ab-solute alterity of the other, hence the infinity of goodness, war would be absolute evil, if one can say this. Neither war nor peace, then, would be ultimately definable in tenns of oppositions, because neither would depend on specifications of a more general genus. But war exceeds opposition by totalization, the elimination of othemess.
With these thou~hts in mind, we can locate war within the hierarchie schema of Levinas's thought as folIows: (I) absolute good orienting from above, manifest through the transcending moral height of the other, the other's absolute priority over the self; (2) the polar historical struggle of good versus evil: the other as needy, the self as the interiorization of for-the-other, as one-for-the-other, the struggle of compassion against hardness of the heart at the inter-personal morallevel, the struggle for justice against injustice at the social, economic and political level; (3) absolute evil below, killing, war, the suspension ofmorality. The realm of the ethical, including both morality and justice, where "the humanity of the human" is constituted and institutionalized, arises in relation to the absolute good "manifest" through the absolute alterity of the face, irreducible moral transcendence. The ethical self charged by this transcendence, is ordained into a moral subjectivity as an insatiable desire for the most desirable, for "the good beyond being." Concrete ethicallife, the struggle to perform moral actions and institute justice, takes place on the historical plane where relative goods and evils are judged closer or farther from the pure good that orients them absolutely. War would be the mockery of this entire ethical schematism, calling not only the good, but both good and evil into question, rendering them ontologically nugatory, sociologically and psychologically naive.
War is thus a mirror image of good. Just as the absolute good renders the concrete ethical realm possible, war would reorient that same realm extra-morally, turning it into an amoral play of forces, interactions whose significance comes without reference to good and evil. Like the absolute good above, but from "the bottom," as it were, war would be incomparable, hence in truth not an absolute evil (such would be the perspective of ethics) but an alternative to both good and evil, the destruction of morality and justice as such. The image of a mirror image is a good one, if we recall Kant's paradox of "incongruent counterparts," where the hand reflected in the mirror is point for point the same hand as the one it reflects, but is nonetheless incongruent with it (the right hand becoming a left hand; the left hand becoming a fight hand). The mirror image of the ethical, from the point ofview ofthe ethical, is the unethical; but from its own point ofview, the point ofview ofwar, it is the extra-ethicaJ, otherwise than ethics, a pJay of forces. Thus, what in peace is the "murder" of a human being, in war is "killing," "slaughter," "wasting" the enemy. The negativity of war would neither be evil nor nothingness, but indifference to morality, shameless shamelessness, guiltless guiltlessness. Nietzsehe will call it "strength" or "health" or "mastery." War, then, is not only a violation ofmorality, it is absolute violence, violence absolutized, force against force.
But why is such an eventuality linked to because glimpsed by "the mind's openness upon the true"?
The logic of epistemology batks at the idea of the transcendence. Relation, not transcendence, is its final word. Logic refuses to assign autonomous meaning to transcendence. The maximum alterity, if onc can put the matter this way, that logic can validate, is not transcendence but the "transcendental," that is to say, extrapolation from the reatm of the relative to its logically necessary and absolute condition.
Kant called this logical requirement for completion, for finality, for wholeness, the "interest of rcason," whether it could be satisfied (as Hegel thought, through he transfonned the very notion of reason to accomplish its fulfillment) or not (as Kant thought). It explains philosophy has so long been at odds with the very possibility of the Creator God as conceived by revealed religion. The transcendent absolves itself from any relations, and hence, for philosophy, with its knowledge interests, can neither be 1~7 experienced nor known. Philosophy considers all efforts to introduce transcendence to be forms of nonphilosophy, labeling these efforts empty speculation, superstition, ignorance, error, madness, immaturity, delusion, slavery, willfulness, stubbomncss, projection, tyranny, and the like. One need only rearl Spinoza's Theologico-Political Treatise (1670) to assemble an almost complete list of the many derogatory labels philosophy has used against the presumptions of absolute transcendence. Having fought long and hard on legitimate epistemological grounds to rise above opinion, mythology and poesis, philosophy is not prepared to submit to an ethics, such as Levinas's, buHt on the absolute transcendence of the good, and is indeed quite weil armcd against jt. The issue for Levinas, however, is to show, despite philosophy's epistemological resistance, how ethics stands or falls in relation --an "unrelating relation,"4 to be sure --to absolute goOO, the good beyond being, and thus to show that "we are not duped by morality."
The opening question of Totality and Infinity, whether or not we are duped by morality, has to do, then, with the significance ofmoral Janguage and conduct, with their sincerity. Ifwar is the ultimate ground of signification whether one prefers fonnulations such as Thrasymachus's "might makes right," Hobbes' "war of all against all," or Nietzsche's "mobile army of metaphors, metonymies, and anthropomorphisms,"5 --to be moral, i.e., to be sincerely moral, Le., to be sincere, is to be duped by morality. Recalling the extra-moral attitude of the pagan Greeks, Nietzsehe cleverly sums up the anti-moral position in a nutshell: "Foolishness, not Sill!, , 6 Machiavelli and Spinoza, more circumspect than Nietzsehe, would say: "prudence," use morality as a mask, be moral insincerely, i.e., don't really be moral but appear to be moral (either to save yourself ör to manipulate the masses, or both, it does not mauer). Levinas's question, then, is not directed to the difficult moral cases, where a moral agent may be duped by an apparent good that turns out to be evil, or by an evil that turns out to be good, or by a partial good weighed against another partial good, moral agency tom between two goods or two evils. In all the cases the issue remains a moral one, the effort to find the good in difficult conlplex situations. Rather the issue raised is one of being duped by the entire struggle of good against evil. War, the blood and guts of real war, a11 out war, whatever reasons are given for its justification, would be the ultimate evidence for this claim. 'The mind's lucidity in its search for truth would apparently catch sight of this pennanent possibility, even in times of apparent peace. Peace, it would corne to .suspect, 1S but a form of war, war modulated by the impositions of past victories and dcfeats. But why single out the mind in its lucidity, in its search for truth?
Is this not to see in the mind's lucidity an essential irony or cynicism? It would know better. It would be superior to all the moralists. Its figure is Raskalnokov, beyond good and evil, or at least he thought so for a time, and with terrible consequences. Or the Marquis de Sade, whose knowledge and model of nature authorized a11 behaviors. The life of the mind is fOT philosophy the life of questioning. All questions may be asked. Am I my brother's keeper? Levinas will say that even to ask this question, to raises doubts regarding one's obligations and responsibilities toward the neighbor, is already to have failed the neighbor and succumbed to evil. Philosophy is shocked by this point of view, insists on its rights, asks its questions.
Thus nothing is authoritative until checked by reason. But does reason see the good? Is reason the proper corrclative to goodness? Is morality rational? By what standards? Must morality be judged by the standards of truth? Of course, morality cannot be a stupidity, but that is not the issue. The issue is whether reason, holding to its own standards, can see the reason to be good.
In the body of Totality and Infinity Levinas will argue that the very temporality of morality, where the self is obligated by the other prior to its own syntheses of identification, deeper than its rational mediations, or its contractual negotiations with alterity, cutting these structures of the for-itsel f to the quick, introjecting the selfmore deeply, in a passivity more passive than receptivity, in a suffering for the other's suffering, that this very temporality escapes the synthetic or ecstatic temporality of knowing. The mind's lucidity, its search for the true, is precisely a process of identification, identifying "this as that." But the good reaches the self prior to its capacities of identification. Knowing, then, will take the unsolicited shock of morality for ignorance, fool ishness, naivete, slavery. But let us stick to the preface.
"Does not lucidity, the mind's openness upon the troe, consist in catching sight of the permanent possibility of war?" Why does the mind, in its very lucidity, in its openness upon the true, end up always catching sight of the possibility of war? Levinas .answers: "We do not need obscure fragments of Heraclitus to prove that being reveals itself as war to philosophical thought, that war does not only affect it as the most patent fact, but as the very patency, or the truth, of the rea1."? What is the connection between the mind's lucidity, truth, reality, and war? Levinas's final answer is one word: totality. "The visage ofbeing that shows itselfin war," Levinas writes, "is fixed in the concept oftotality, which dominates Western philosophy.nS A final refonnulation of our question: what is the connection, or what are the connections, between the mind's lucidity, truth, reality, war and totality? The answer is clear: the truth of reality revealed to the mind in its lucidity is always "fixed in the concept oftotality." What does this mean? How or why is this so?
1"0 know is to explain, to relate, to synthesize, to identify, to understand "x as y," to Iocate an individual within a context, the unknown within the known. "Individuals are reduced," Levinas writes, "to being bearers of forces that command them unbeknown to themselves. outside of this totality) is derived from the totality.,,9 For the mind in its lucidity meaning does not come from the individual qua individual. Thus an individual's moral agency could not derive from itself, from some inner faculty, such was the error of a11 the moral sentimentalists, whether they saw the human as innately evil (e.g., the doctrine of "original sin") or innately good (e.g., Shaftesbury). The sense of any individual, to the extent that is has meaning, derives from its context, structure, system, ultinlately from a totality. Insofar as the mind's lucidity sees the inter-relations between al1 individuals within one system --the universe which is always one --each individual is ultimately dcfined as a function of al1 others. The most distant star is Iinked to an ant's antennae. Relations define terms, which are nothing outside tnose relations.
Lucidity, then, consists in grasping the "forces that command [individuals] unbeknown to themselves." One recognizes this lucidity at work in the hard sciences, for certainly no one sees the atoms and force fields that are said to determine natural reality. But what disturbs Levinas is not knowledge per se, but rather its hegemonization, the imposition of this fonn of lucidity --differential knowledge --as if it were the only or the total fonn oflucidity, and hence the one and only form oflucidity appropriate to such "objects" as human beings. And yet the hegemonization ofknowledge is not some accident but contained within the very nature or impetus ofknowledge, whose "interest" is ultinlately to elaborate thc whole, the detcrminate whole, within which individuals make sense.
Of course there can be no doubt that humans can be studied objectively. Humans, like all material beings, have a certain chemical composition, are subject to certain physical forces. Humans also interact with other humans in predictable ways, ways uncovered by sociology, political science, economics. It must be emphasized that Levinas does not object to knowledge, and will argue that knowledge is required by justice. His objection, .however, is that knowledge is not its own ground, is not the total account it pretends to be. Furthennore, his objection is that knowledge, when taken on its own, can never understand 9TI. pp. 21-22. morality, but instead glimpse the permanent possibility of war. Hence Levinas will not propose in Tota/ity alld !Ilfinity a more refined epistenlology. Rather, he will accentuate thc imposition ethics makes on epistemology, from beyond its confines. I-Ie will insist that beyond epistemology all is not ignorance. Instead, he will arguethat within epistemology lies the threat of ignorance, ignorance ofright and wrong, good and evil.
The truth or reality of the human individual, according to knowledgc, would consist not in the individuality of the individual in his or her moral integrity or singularity, as the subject of obligations and the bearer of responsibilities, but rather the individual's integration into a larger whole, its place in a totality, the "role," as we say today, one inevitably plays, whether consciously or not, within in a larger scheme, whether our eyes are closed or open, awake or asleep. The Cartesians thought of the theater within which human individual are puppets as a mechanics ultimately reducible to a lnathesis; Hegel considered it a dialectical Logic and called its hold over human individuals "the cunning of history"; Heidegger calls it the "ontological difference," or "language," the "hollse of being"; Derrida, will rename the ontological difference in the house of language "differance." In every case thc same philosophical gesture prevails, the same epistemological impetus to reduce the individual to a differential node.
Knowtedge would thus reduce moral freedom to an epiphenomenon, whether in the name of a logic of necessary or differential forces basicalJy material (Hobbes, Spinoza, La Mettrie, Sade, Nietzsche), historical (Hegel, Spencer, Heidegger, Foucault), economic (Smith, Marx), psychological (Freud, Jung), or linguistic (Derrida). In every case, human freedom would not be itself, would not be free. Human action would no longer consist in beginning from oneself, from one's own initiative, however active or passive. The mind's lucidity sees through moral talk to the truth, where initiative confonns to a deeper hidden order 0/things, reality in its truth. Realism not morality would have the final say. The only "moral" dictum for philosophy would be that which enabled Spinoza to name his metaphysics an Ethics, the motivation behind all science: Be real.
The on)y human option: to be or not to be. Freedom would thus be necessity, recognition of an inevitable confonnity to the way things are, accepting one's inevitable place, a cog within a larger totality. Even Sartre, the celebratcd "philosopher of freedom," defincd freedom in tenns of existence, as negation of the real, hence as a matter of lucidity and only a matter of lucidity. Though one is rather less sanguine today about the completeness -or finality of the mind's lucidity, lucidity still guides philosophical conceptions of freedom. Yet when all is said and done, neither skepticism nor irony nor cynicism --the moral products of science --can serve as substitutes for morality. They are rather symptoms of its loss. Science cannot pull itself up by its bootstraps, it may know the real, but It lacks a why and wherefore.
In this way Levinas shows the intimate relation between the interests of epistemology and an ontology of war, war as the ultimate vision of epistemology. War is fundamental when the reality to which an individual's understanding conforms, and from which an individual derives its entire sense, is nothing more and nothing other than a calculus of forces. In view of this vision, this "framing," as Heidegger called it, alternative meanings --including all of morality --would become a shadow play of second-order interpretations explained away as weakness, ignorance, infantilism, primitivism, class con~ciousness, etc.. "Concerning these things," Parmenides wrote, "the decision lies here: either it is, or it is not. But it has been decided, as was necessary, that the one way is unknowable and unnameable (for it is not true road) and that the other is real and true."IO Heraclitus, despite his opposition to Pannenides, indecd because of his op-position to Parmenides, works within the same parameters, defined by being and non-being, though he sides with non-being. Thus he ends by expressing the same "truth" as Pannenides, but even more succinctly: "War is the father and king of all."11 What sleepwalkers label "murder," for instance, would in truth be the natural or cultural product of a play of hidden involuntary forces, such as genetic coding, diet, famj]y, glossed with an unreflective but merely cultural interpretation. "But," declares Nietzsche, "there is no 'being' behind doing, effecting, becoming; 'the doer' is merely a fiction added to the deed --the deed is everything. ... [N] o wonder if the submerged, darkly glowering emotions of vengefulness and hatred exploit this belief [of the doer behind the deed] more ardently than the belief that the strollg man is free to be weak and the bird of prey to be a lamb --for thus they gain the right to make the bird ofprey accolllltable for being a bird ofprey." The murderer is not a "murderer" reali)' but a natural born killer. The moral language of "murder," "sin," "guilt," "punishment," would be semantic misunderstanding, unscientific glosse What is really at work is power, will to power, the war of all against a11.
If the mind's lucid vision of the truth of reality is ultimate and war fundamental, it follows that inter-human relations are also, in the final account, a matter ofpolitics, diplomacy, rhetoric, success, a matter of strategy and tactic but not morality. The science of the real would be truth, morality would for ignoramuses. Thus Spinoza's book about religion and morality is ultimately a political manual, a Theologico-Political Treatise, written for those who see truth in order to protect themselves from those who do not see. Knowers want neither to be duped by morality nor to be harmed by the ignorance of "moralists." The language of morality would be a rhetorical strategy or tactic in a deeper game of politics, just as the world knew that the "Desert Storm" war was not about democracy in the Middle East or the political integrity of Kuwait, but rather about protecting the price and flow of inexpensive oil for America. "The art of foreseeing war," Levinas writes, "and of winning it by every means --politics --is henceforth enjoined as the very exercise of reason. Politics is opposed to morality, as philosophy to naivete." Hobbes, Spinoza and Nietzsche could hardly be more explicit agreeing with perspective, but it is no less at play in Heidegger, Foucault and Derrida.
But if we are not duped by morality, if epistemology does not have the last word, then politics can have an entirely different meaning. War itself would be judged. One would distinguish just from unjust wars. If we are not duped by morality, if sincerity and not totality is the ground of the truc, then politics too would serve or dis-serve the good. Rather than a disguised form of war, an indice of victories and defeats, politics would rather be another way of instituting goodness. Politics aiming for justice, poJitics in relation to ethical transcendence, would be "messianic." In an imperfect world whose imperfection would not consist simply in incomplete knowledge, but rather in the separation of the "oughf' from the "is," the ultimate struggle would not be the sheer power of one force against other forces but the ethical effort to restrain evil and promote good, in moral judgements which would provide the ultimate meaning and measure of politics.
Politics would have a transcendent dimension: to act for another future than one's own, to act for the future ofhumanity.
In this way peace would underlie struggle, even the struggles that break out in war. In contrast to the virile values of a warrior culture, war in this case would aim not only for victory but for a just peace. Peace, then, like war, has two radically different senses, one genuine and the other a disguised fonn of war, cold war. For peace, too, can be a fonn of war, the peace of Pax Romana, is at bottom war --Pax in bello --because it is not the peace that concludes war, but the temporary equilibrium established and maintained by the victories and defeats of war. In the peace that is at bottom war, peace is really only victory, the imposition of order, placing one's own idols in the other's te"!ples, reducing the other to the same. Such ersatz peace violate's singularity --the other's and one's own --because it is enforced precisely to the extent that singularity is repressed. Its epistemological fonn is knowing the individuality of the individual not in its singularity but in its subsumption under the general, its placement within a calculus, its contextualization, as if this truth of the individual, and only this truth, were equivalent to the singularity of the individual.
These two senses of peace, like the two senses of war, dcpcnd on two very different approaches to the uniqueness ofthe individual: extemal and interna!. Extemally.itis an undeniable truth that all spacial-temporal entities are unique insofar as no two of them occupy the same space at the same time. Here individuality derives from position, location, context, differentials. Any resistance to this differential uniqueness would not be fundamental, but would rcflect only an indetennination that has lIot_l'et been grasped. Indetennination, which nlight SeCITI to be the secret or mystery ofthe individual, is in reality but a dclay or deferral --even if never recouperable of determination in tenns of a larger whole. What would resist knowledge in the individual would thus be essentially relative, provisional, the "not yet," but in no way an absolute resistance. "The peace of empires," Levinas writes, "issued from war rests on war."
But uniqueness can also mean singularity. Not a place within a system, but a starting point, a degree zero, an initiative, which orients --and judges --all differential contexts. This signification can make no sense from a purely cognitive point of view, which always contextualizes. Rather, its sense is from the first ethicaI. l-Iere morality would not be a temporary ignorance, a naive gloss on reality, but rather the very source of meaning. Deeper than the distinctions bctween reality and appearance, truth and falsehood would depend on the distinction between sincerity and masquerade, suffering and indifference, for-the-other and for-oneself, good and evil. An individual alone, the knowing subject, would be a11 truth, to be sure, but it would also be all illusion --it would lack the capacity of verification. All meanings would be possible, but none could be secured, none would be true or false. One thinks of Descartes's problem of solipsism, but no less of the delusions of Dr. Daniel Shreiber. Only the radical alterity of the other person has the force --moral force --to obligate and fix the seIf, the self subject as subjected to the other, as responsibility for the other. The radical alterity of the other person bursts through forms, historicalor otherwise, and commands absolutely, i.e., commands ethicaIly. "Thou shalt not murder" commands behind everything said. In the face of such a face the self is held to itself deeper than the confines of any context. "I am my brother's keeper," in the face of the other, prior to my own questions. That is to say, the I is itself insofar as it is its brother's keeper, the I is --ethically exists --in the mode of a brother's keeper. The self is itself ethically subject to the other, as for-the-other-before-itself. Only by means of this proximity, can one approach another in peace. Only in this proximity is the ultimate and ethical significance of the \vorld constituted. Here peace would not be a temporary or artificial order imposed by reducing the other to the same, or the same to the other, a victory or a defeat. Rather peace would come --even in times ofwar l2 --from the proximity ofunique singularities whose significance comes from a breach in the totality, an ethical breach. Not to be, but to be better.
Genuine peace disrupts the totalization of war not by defeating it, but by transcending its reach. Moral power would not be stronger than the real, but better. Hence nothing is weaker and at the same time nothing is stronger than moral power, for it transcends yet commands the power of war. Philosophy, bound to the real, bound to the true, refuses to acknowledge the radical transcendence of ethics, for philosophy is always "first philosophy" as philosophy first. Yet the stringent requirements of ethics are not more stupid than philosophy, they are faster, as it were, deeper, more important. Shame, suffering, obligation, responsibility, justice are not insufficient knowledge, they are impositions, inlposed before they can be known, imposed with priorities prior to knowledge. Before one knows the good one does the good. Inserting a non-cognitive moral dimension into philosophical discourse, speaking Hebrew in Greek, as it were, is the entire effort and effect of Levinas's writings. Peace would thus not be more naive than war but more trusting, more difficult.
Morality exerts more stringent requirements than the requirements of knowledge. It demands responsibility in a self prior to the "I think" which subsequently will know itself to be the ground of all knowledge. Knowledge comes first, to be sure, but already too late. Ethics also comes last. It makes demands on a self beyond its most ecstatic projections, obligations extending into a future not its own --the future of humanity, justice --beyond foreseeable horizons, but already imposed by the other who faces. It is prior to and beyond knowledge not as a transcendental apriori, i.e., as a condition of knowledge, but rather because the exigency of its demands, the obligation of its beginning, an initiative called forth by the other. It undennines participatory submergence as weil as reflective contextualization by the greater stringencies, the more intense demands, that emerge from taking responsibility. It transforms self and society trom place holders, whether blind or seeing, to source points of personal and social obligations, responsibilities, and the call for justice. "Not with the voice that would surround the totality," Levinas writes, "and where one could, arbitrarily, think what one likes, and thus promote the claims of a subjectivity free as the wind. It is a relationship with a surplus always exterior to the totality." This surplus which bursts through myth and structure is precisely and nothing other than the commanding "face" of the other which obligates the self to its responsibility for the other and for all others.
Out of this initiate comes the peace of a genuine and not merely a differential difference. Moral proximity with the other is an expression neither of victory or defeat, nor is it a complacency, indifference or self-satisfaction confined within a closed or open system. Rather it is the difficult peace which comes from "non-in-difference" to the other. Here peace is not the result of reduction, whether pre-reflective submergence or reflective contextualization, but rather as the most sober sobriety, wakefulness itself, respect for difference as response to difference. Not the peace of identity, whether lost or found, but the peace of piuralism. Fission not fusion. The land the other, and the I and others, are not reduced to the sameness of mythic participation or of intelligible identity, but rather are stimulated, provoked, disrupted, oriented toward and by the good. The I is thus neither a part nor a whole, but is rather the shattered initiative of an always insufficient ethical approach to the other, a moral proximity. In this fissuring ofthe self --the egoity ofthe I as its brother's keeper, the I for-the-other --subjectivity is elected to itself, to its singularity. Each self is singularly the unique bearer of obligations and responsibilities, a moral Atlas, hearing the whole world in its ethical incompleteness. Levinas is . fond of quoting the words of the Priest Zossima's mortally ill eIder brother Markel from Dostoyevsky's The Brotlzer's Karamozov: "We are all guilty of all and for all men before a11, and I more than others." Upon each self weigh obligations and obligations, the responsibility of its responsibilities, are more important than knowledge, and as such give significance to knowledge, providing it the orientation --the why and wherefore --which knowledge essentially lacks. This point must be emphasized. Knowledge knows only difference, but cannot judge better or worse. The exigencies of morality and justice, in contrast, are not merely different than the requirement of knowledge, since knowledge comprehends nothing better than difference, they are at the same time more importallt than the priorities of philosophy, and for this reason provide orientation for knowledgc as for all hunlan endeavor. The beginning of wisdom cuts dceper than the origins ofknowledge. Philosophy is thus always already in the service of an ethics it can hardly acknowledge. First, the alterity of the other is an obligation before it is an object. Second, the responsibility of the seI f is a responsiveness before it is a cognition. Third, these obligations and responsibilities which emerge in the proximity of the face-to-face call beyond the horizons foreseeable by knowledge, for they are a call for an unforeseeabIe justice for a11 humankind. Desire, the self constituted as a desiring being, thus has at bottom a far greater and far more difficult destiny than that known by phiJosophy with its desire to be transfigured by the desire to know. More desirable still is the desire for goodness, where desire grows as it is satisfied, in an always insufficient responsibility for the other before oneself, suffering the otber's suffenng, aiming at what cannot be foreseen, predicted, grasped in a totaJity.
One must take pains whcn articulating an ethics to avoid interpreting morality in terms of knowledge. To be sure, knowledge and morality share a critique of mythe But they do so with different ends in view.
Knowledge undermines the submergence of self and society in tbe arbitrary forces invoked through participatory myth by a relocation of self and society into a geometry of principles and proportions, into a differential calculus of ideas. Mythic submergence is transformed and raised to intelligible justification, to reasons and a giving of reasons. Morality, in contrast, is not simply a relocation of the subject from intoxication to reflection, but is rather a taking of responsibility, a taking on of obligations, beginning at the responsibilities for eaeh other and for aIl others. This weight, which human seales cannot measure, is the moral self. Singularity emerges as a nonsubstitutable responsibility, a moral burden upon which the reality of the whole world depends. Or else there is just war. But war cannot suppress this paeifie relation to the other, this sincerity, this goodness.
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